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Abstract  
 
The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and Peru came into 
effect on March 1, 2012. This paper provides background information about this 
agreement’s significance, mostly from a Peruvian point of view. It focuses on the 
following subjects: the statistical trends showing Peru’s declining shares in Japan’s 
trade and investment flows with Latin American countries between the mid-1970s 
and mid-2000s, the main explanatory factors of such a deterioration in Peru’s 
economic position over that period, the changes of trade policy strategy in both 
countries since the 2000s, and the EPA negotiation process and some of its key 
results as featured in the text of the agreement. 
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Introduction 
 
The Economic Partnership Agreement – also known as Free Trade Agreement (FTA) – 
between Japan and Peru is a strategic tool not only of trade policy but of foreign policy 
as well. In fact, the decision to negotiate it reflected both countries shared purpose of 
reinvigorating their bilateral relations, which had cooled off during the first half of the 
past decade when Alberto Fujimori settled in Japan after his unprecedented resignation 
to the Presidency of Peru via fax. From a Peruvian perspective, the significance of this 
FTA lies additionally in its potential contribution to the objective of recovering the 
privileged position that Peru had some decades ago in the economic relations of Japan 
with South America. 
 
With the purpose of substantiating the argument above, this research paper is 
organized as follows. Its first section provides a panoramic and compact account of the 
statistics that show the loss of relative weight of Peru in the trade and investment flows 
between Japan and Latin American countries, from the mid-seventies onwards. The 
second section analyses the main factors explaining the said Peru’s loss of economic 
relevance before Japan. This facilitates a better understanding of the significance that 
the FTA with Japan has for Peru in the framework of its recent strategy, which is 
discussed in the third section of the paper, alongside with some of Japan’s economic 
motivations in favor of the FTA with Peru. The ensuing common ground between both 
national interests provides the needed background for the fourth section, referred to the 
negotiation of the FTA and its main results as featured in the agreement’s text. Some 
final remarks conclude the paper. 
 
I. Overview of Japan’s trade and investment flows with Latin America 
 
A widely known fact is the sharp contraction of Japan’s relative weight in Latin 
American trade flows with the Asia-Pacific region. Table 1 shows the shift of Japan from 
being the largely dominant Asian trade partner of Latin America in the seventies, as 
destination market (77.5%) and also as import supplier (86.1%), to having in recent 
years a share of around 20% in both flows –exports and imports- of Latin America’s 
trade with the Asia-Pacific region.1 
 
                                                  
1 As widely known is China’s rise to the position of main Asian trade partner of Latin America since the 2000s 
decade. Previously, starting in the mid-eighties, the rising shares as Asian trade partners of Latin America were those 
of the so-called ‘Newly Industrializing Economies’ (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan) and, to a lesser extent, of 
some ASEAN countries [Ruiz, 1990; Moneta, 1991; Torres, 1991].    
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Table 1 
Trade of Latin America with Japan: 1975, 1990, 1997, 2008/6 
1975 1990 1997 2008 1975 1990 1997 2006
77.5% 54.7% 39.5% 19.9% 86.1% 60.7% 39.5% 20.8%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Mexico 9.3% 20.8% 11.6% 10.9% 8.4% 23.5% 31.5% 58.8%
Central America 10.5% 1.5% 1.6% 1.2% 8.0% 8.7% 5.8% 5.9%
Costa Rica 0.5% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 1.8% 3.0% 1.7% 2.3%
CAN 15.2% 17.9% 14.2% 13.7% 30.3% 19.8% 17.8% 11.6%
Bolivia 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 2.5% 1.3% 1.7% 0.9%
Colombia 1.8% 3.7% 4.1% 2.0% 4.0% 9.1% 6.7% 3.6%
Ecuador 0.7% 0.7% 1.8% 0.5% 4.3% 3.1% 1.9% 1.8%
Peru 9.8% 6.1% 5.4% 9.8% 6.0% 1.7% 3.4% 2.2%
Venezuela 1.7% 7.3% 2.8% 0.2% 13.5% 4.7% 4.2% 3.2%
Chile 12.1% 19.8% 30.7% 38.4% 2.2% 10.4% 7.4% 4.4%
MERCOSUR 53.0% 40.0% 41.9% 35.8% 51.1% 37.5% 37.4% 19.3%
Argentina 8.8% 5.7% 6.3% 2.7% 14.2% 3.3% 7.9% 3.6%
Brazil 43.5% 33.9% 35.1% 32.5% 36.2% 29.5% 26.9% 14.8%
Paraguay 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.3% 3.8% 1.9% 0.8%
Uruguay 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.8% 0.7% 0.2%
Source: World Bank's WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) data, as processed for this research paper.
Exports Imports
Latin America
 
 
Peru’s decreasing share as a Latin American trade partner of Japan 
 
But less known in detail are some of the changes that took place within Latin America 
in its countries’ relative weights in trade flows with Japan, during the three decades 
depicted in the first three tables of this section. In particular, Table 1 shows that Peru, 
despite having the second largest population of Japanese ancestry in South America, 
has lost importance in the region’s trade with Japan, especially in the respective import 
flows –from fifth place in 1975 to eighth in 2006- and also, though to a lesser extent, in 
the respective export flows –from third to fourth between the said years.  
 
Even more revealing are other changes in the ranking of Latin American countries’ 
trade with Japan. In fact, standing out from Table 1 are, on one hand, the sharp 
decreases in the shares of the two largest South American economies –Brazil and 
Argentina- as importers from Japan as well as exporters to Japan and, on the other 
hand, the strong increases in Chile’s share as exporter to Japan and in Mexico’s share as 
importer from Japan. As a result, Brazil, the South American country endowed with the 
largest population of Japanese ancestry, is no longer the main Latin American trade 
partner of Japan –as it was until nineties, but has become the second in recent years 
–after Chile as exporter and after Mexico as importer. Other interesting changes are the 
improved shares of Costa Rica and Colombia in Latin American imports from Japan 
–which, between 1975 and 2006, moved up from tenth to seventh place and from 
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seventh to fourth place, respectively.  
 
Before looking at to what extent those ranking changes may be explained by changes in 
the sector structure of Latin American traded products, and/or by changes in the 
country distribution of Japan’s FDI in Latin America, it seems relevant to continue 
analyzing the Japan-Latin America trade flows in aggregate but this time from a 
Japan’s trade perspective.  
 
This perspective allows for characterizing the ranking changes among Latin American 
countries portrayed above, as a tense re-distribution of a shrinking pie. Indeed, this 
re-distribution did not occur in the midst of an increasing participation of Latin America 
in Japan’s world trade but, on the contrary, it happened while the region’s participation 
in Japanese trade was declining, especially as a destination market for Japanese 
exports (from 7.1% in 1975 to 4.6% in 2008) and also, though to a lesser extent, as 
supplier of Japanese imports (from 3.7% in 1975 to 3.2% in 2006).   
 
It is in such a context, of a diminished importance of Latin America in Japan’s foreign 
trade, that Japanese exports to the region were directed relatively less to South 
America (which share in regional imports from Japan fell significantly –from 58.7% in 
1975 to 38.2% in 2008) and relatively more to Mexico (turning this country into the 
main Latin American importer from Japan, as it has already been pointed out). 
 
In addition, Table 2 provides a detailed overview of what happened within South 
America and unveils some interesting facts: while the shares in imports from Japan of 
the two sub-regional groupings (MERCOSUR and CAN, which together account for the 
bulk of South American GDP) dropped both –and quite significantly so in the CAN case- 
between 1975 and 2008, a medium-sized individual economy (Chile) almost tripled its 
share during the same period. At the same time, even though Peru and Colombia both 
increased their respective shares in imports from Japan at the CAN level, only 
Colombia increased its share also at the level of the whole Latin America (from 2.8% to 
3.1% between 1975 and 2008) while Peru’s share at this level was reduced to almost half 
(from 4.8% to 2.7% over the same period). 
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Table 2 
Exports of Asia-Pacific/Japan to Latin America: 1975, 1997, 2008 
1975 1997 2008 1975 1997 2008 1975 1997 2008
Asia-Pacific 24.1% 11.2% 13.0% 2.2% 7.6% 8.2% 33.3% 29.8% 30.6% 100%
East Asia 23.7% 11.0% 12.9% 2.3% 7.4% 8.1% 32.4% 29.5% 30.3% 100%
Japan 23.3% 13.2% 10.7% 2.4% 5.8% 7.6% 33.0% 21.4% 19.8% 100%
China n.a. 8.3% 16.2% n.a. 13.4% 9.2% n.a. 40.0% 38.3% 100%
NIEs 25.2% 9.7% 9.1% 1.0% 7.7% 7.5% 22.4% 34.3% 25.1% 100%
Korea 23.4% 11.3% 10.8% 1.0% 8.3% 10.3% 24.9% 31.8% 22.7% 100%
Singapore 18.1% 2.4% 1.7% 0.8% 3.8% 1.3% 26.6% 33.4% 18.1% 100%
ASEAN-4 48.0% 7.4% 15.8% 1.4% 8.4% 5.7% 28.1% 43.3% 38.9% 100%
Oceania 31.5% 18.3% 17.8% 0.7% 14.8% 9.6% 48.5% 40.6% 44.4% 100%
1975 1997 2008 1975 1997 2008 1975 1997 2008
Asia-Pacific 11.6% 35.8% 28.7% 24.9% 19.8% 24.7% 37.8% 28.2% 28.6% 100%
East Asia 12.3% 36.6% 29.4% 20.7% 18.8% 25.1% 39.7% 27.8% 27.1% 100%
Japan 11.9% 41.0% 29.0% 20.7% 13.9% 25.4% 38.7% 26.9% 24.9% 100%
China n.a. 20.0% 27.5% n.a. 28.1% 25.6% n.a. 34.2% 31.0% 100%
NIEs 22.1% 34.4% 34.5% 13.2% 25.2% 23.7% 51.2% 25.7% 22.7% 100%
Korea 9.5% 36.4% 34.3% 11.7% 26.5% 22.6% 33.8% 24.8% 22.9% 100%
Singapore 45.9% 29.8% 36.3% 20.6% 27.5% 26.3% 28.2% 35.6% 21.8% 100%
ASEAN-4 6.5% 27.6% 28.9% 39.5% 21.5% 24.8% 53.1% 40.4% 19.0% 100%
Oceania 3.2% 17.0% 6.6% 75.9% 39.9% 11.7% 14.0% 37.4% 78.9% 100%
Source: World Bank's WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) data, as processed for this research paper.
Latin 
America
CAN
CAN Chile MERCOSUR
Colombia Peru Venezuela
 
 
Other interesting facts get unveiled thanks to the similarly detailed data in Table 3, 
this time on Japanese imports from Latin America –that is, on Latin American exports 
to Japan. These still originate for most part –and increasingly so- in South America 
(82.3% in 2006, up from 79.2% in 1975)2, but basically because Chile more than tripled 
its share as Latin American exporter to Japan, given that the share of MERCOSUR 
decreased significantly and the share of CAN stagnated.  
 
Moreover, in the same way that Table 1 showed that within MERCOSUR the export 
shares negatively affected were the ones of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil –in such a 
relative order, Table 3 shows that, within the CAN, Peru is still the main exporter to 
Japan but its share has been the most negatively affected one, whereas Colombia’s and 
Venezuela’s 3 shares increased both at the Andean level and the one of Colombia 
increased also at the level of the whole Latin America (from 1.7% in 1975 to 1.9% in 
2006). 
 
                                                  
2 Mexico’s share as Latin American exporter to Japan also increased (from 10% in 1975 to 15.2% in 2006), but the 
one of Central America was significantly reduced (from 10.8% to 2.5% over the same period).  
3 The period analyzed explains the inclusion of Venezuela as part of the CAN. 
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When looking for explanations behind ranking changes such as the identified above, the 
search usually starts by exploring the possible roles of changes in types of products 
traded and/or of changes in the destination of investments. Thus, these possible roles 
are examined in the rest of this section. 
 
Table 3 
Imports of Asia-Pacific/Japan from Latin America: 1975, 1997, 2006 
1975 1997 2006 1975 1997 2006 1975 1997 2006
Asia-Pacific 14.0% 12.3% 13.9% 11.0% 24.4% 25.1% 52.8% 46.3% 44.0% 100%
East Asia 14.0% 12.4% 14.1% 11.3% 24.7% 25.6% 52.4% 46.1% 44.1% 100%
Japan 14.6% 14.0% 12.7% 12.2% 27.4% 39.0% 52.4% 40.4% 30.6% 100%
China n.a. 20.7% 18.0% n.a. 11.3% 17.4% n.a. 62.8% 51.2% 100%
NIEs 8.6% 8.8% 12.3% 5.1% 29.3% 32.2% 50.6% 40.4% 36.8% 100%
Korea 14.7% 11.3% 12.0% 12.1% 29.3% 40.3% 6.8% 38.1% 34.8% 100%
Singapore 8.7% 4.7% 20.9% 7.8% 21.0% 7.5% 62.0% 22.5% 36.3% 100%
ASEAN-4 10.4% 8.2% 3.6% 2.0% 18.5% 10.4% 55.8% 61.3% 65.9% 100%
Oceania 13.7% 10.6% 5.8% 2.3% 11.8% 6.8% 68.8% 51.6% 41.7% 100%
1975 1997 2006 1975 1997 2006 1975 1997 2006
Asia-Pacific 11.4% 15.6% 10.3% 64.1% 50.2% 51.8% 10.9% 15.3% 30.8% 100%
East Asia 11.5% 15.4% 10.2% 65.7% 50.8% 51.8% 11.1% 15.5% 31.1% 100%
Japan 11.6% 25.0% 15.3% 66.3% 35.8% 55.7% 10.9% 22.7% 13.6% 100%
China n.a. 0.4% 4.4% n.a. 81.6% 48.9% n.a. 4.7% 44.4% 100%
NIEs 17.2% 14.9% 20.1% 40.2% 41.3% 52.5% 19.7% 13.6% 17.1% 100%
Korea 15.0% 15.5% 18.2% 69.9% 23.1% 59.7% 0.0% 13.0% 6.7% 100%
Singapore 19.8% 13.3% 28.3% 19.1% 33.1% 6.4% 61.0% 53.0% 63.1% 100%
ASEAN-4 1.3% 5.8% 12.3% 83.0% 74.6% 73.4% 4.4% 11.2% 6.4% 100%
Oceania 7.7% 25.4% 17.8% 7.4% 24.8% 49.3% 0.8% 5.8% 2.8% 100%
Source: World Bank's WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) data, as processed for this research paper.
CAN
Latin 
America
CAN Chile MERCOSUR
Colombia Peru Venezuela
 
 
Role of the sector structure of Latin American exports 
 
To what extent may the aforementioned changes, in the relative position of Latin 
American countries in its region’s trade flows with Japan, be explained by differences in 
the sector structure of Latin American countries’ exports to Japan?4  
 
On the basis of Table 4 data, the straight answer is that in none or very little extent 
regarding the changes in relative weights among Chile, MERCOSUR and Peru, because 
there are no major differences in the sector structure of their respective products 
exported to Japan. As a matter of fact, all three have in common a growing 
                                                  
4 This paper does not address this same question in reference to Latin American imports. As is well known, imports 
from developed countries such as Japan typically include, for most part, capital goods, consumer durables and 
technologically sophisticated inputs. Therefore, we would expect that differences in their structure among Latin 
American countries be more subtle and would require a more disaggregated analysis, left for further research.  
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concentration of their exports to Japan in commodities or primary goods (PG) between 
1997 and 2008. Thus, we should look for other factors in order to duly explain Chile’s 
impressive gains in participation within the South American trade flows with Japan 
and the concurrent losses of MERCOSUR and Peru. Some of the most relevant factors 
are reviewed in Section II of this paper, focused on the particular case of Peru but where 
it will be examined a factor also important for the case of MERCOSUR, referred to 
transport infrastructure and logistics.   
 
Table 4 
Sector Structure of Latin American Exports to Japan: 1997, 2008 
1997 2008 1997 2008 1997 2008
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
PG 69.3% 41.3% 88.4% 31.1% 87.0% 79.3%
NRBM 8.5% 14.2% 2.6% 0.2% 12.7% 3.3%
LTM 12.9% 29.5% 5.3% 59.1% 0.2% 2.0%
MTM 4.9% 12.4% 1.5% 9.6% 0.1% 15.2%
HTM 3.5% 2.6% 2.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2%
NC 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1997 2008 1997 2008 1997 2008
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
PG 47.7% 75.9% 46.3% 72.7% 50.3% 67.9%
NRBM 19.6% 14.1% 36.4% 18.6% 14.3% 8.1%
LTM 32.3% 9.8% 16.8% 6.7% 24.7% 14.9%
MTM 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 1.8% 8.2% 7.9%
HTM 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 2.5% 1.3%
NC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Source: World Bank's WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) data, as processed for this paper.
Note: Sector structure based on S. Lall's following classification: PG = Primary Goods; NRBM = Natu-
ral Resource-Based Manufactures; LTM = Low-Technology Manufactures; MTM = Medium-
Technology Manufactures; HTM = High-Technology Manufactures; NC = Non-Classified.
Mexico ColombiaCosta Rica
MERCOSURChilePeru
 
 
On the other hand, changes in the sector structure of products exported to Japan are 
likely an explanatory factor of the increased shares of Mexico, Costa Rica and Colombia 
in Latin American trade with Japan, not only as exporters to this country but also –and 
even more so- as importers of Japanese products. In fact, Table 4 shows the 
diversification of each of these three Latin American countries’ exports to Japan, where 
manufactures are already predominant in the cases of Costa Rica and Mexico, and in all 
three cases there are remarkable achievements in exports of medium-technology 
manufactures (MTM) as well as some interesting evidences of exporting high-tech 
manufactures (HTM).  
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Such export performances obviously reflects the existence of a manufacturing 
production capacity undergoing a process of competitiveness upgrading, implying a 
growing demand for inputs and capital goods of better quality as the produced in 
developed economies, therefore generating a dynamic flow of imports from countries 
like Japan. All of which explains in turn the increased participation of the three 
aforementioned countries in Latin American imports from Japan.  
 
Peru’s decreasing share as a Latin American recipient of Japanese investments 
 
There is a consensus among experts in attributing the propelling role for both 
phenomena –i.e. the export diversification towards more technology-intensive 
manufactures, and the related greater dynamism in imports from developed economies- 
to the attraction of investments in manufacturing activities not –or to a lesser extent- 
based on natural resources, given that investments of that sort are the more prone to 
generate intra-industry trade. According to the specialized literature, the attraction of 
that type of investments was enhanced by NAFTA in the case of Mexico; in the Costa 
Rica case, it emerged from the installation in the country of an important multinational 
INTEL [see, for example: CEPAL, 2000]; and in Colombia it responded to the country’s 
condition of main participant in the CAN automotive agreement as well as of main CAN 
member exporter of manufactures to the Andean sub-regional market [BID-INTAL, 
2005].  
 
To what extent have Japanese investments in Latin America played such a propelling 
role? Unfortunately, the more reliable of the accessible statistics sources on the matter 
do not facilitate an answer. For long periods as the covered by this study, they do not 
release investment data disaggregated by sectors but aggregate flows only, and these 
pose the following caveats.  
 
As shown in Table 5, when options for direct investment in production capacity (FDI) 
were sharply reduced due to the Latin America’s debt crisis and its following “lost 
decade” of the eighties, Japanese investment was diverted to Panama and other “tax 
heavens” in the Caribbean and has, for the most part, remained there in spite of the 
region’s regained attractiveness in the next decades. However, those “tax heavens” are 
useful not only for speculation purposes but also in order to conduct trading and 
financial operations related to “real” FDI in different locations, which is why these 
statistics underestimate “real” FDI in other countries of the region.  
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Table 5 
Japanese Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean: 1965-2004 
 
1965-1975 1976-1990 1991-1999 2000-2004
World 1,377      19,658     46,102     37,966     
Latin America 17.6% 12.8% 10.5% 16.0%
and Caribbean 100% 100% 100% 100%
Mexico 5.0% 4.6% 7.2% 2.7%
Caribbean 15.2% 35.2% 49.0% 64.6%
Cayman Isles 0.3% 19.5% 29.6% 58.7%
Bermuda 11.7% 3.4% 7.9% 3.4%
Bahamas 0.8% 9.1% 1.7% 1.3%
Central America 4.4% 43.2% 27.3% 18.8%
Panama 3.3% 43.0% 27.2% 18.8%
Costa Rica 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
CAN 19.0% 1.8% 1.3% 0.1%
Bolivia 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Colombia 0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0%
Ecuador 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Peru 16.3% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1%
Venezuela 1.9% 0.8% 1.0% 0.0%
Chile 3.1% 0.6% 0.8% 0.4%
MERCOSUR 52.6% 14.5% 14.3% 13.4%
Argentina 0.7% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9%
Brazil 51.4% 13.4% 13.2% 12.4%
Paraguay 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Uruguay 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Source: Japan's Ministry of Finance data, as processed 
for this research paper.  
 
In some cases, such underestimation can be concealing FDI that has effectively taken 
place. This is very likely the case of Colombia, where an important part of the Japanese 
automotive FDI migrated from Peru due to an effective strategy of the former with 
respect to the CAN sub-regional market, whereas the latter applied a wrong trade 
policy during the nineties in terms of tariffs and before the CAN [Gonzalez-Vigil, 2001]. 
It is possible that similar statistical mists also blur the picture of what happened in 
Costa Rica and Chile. Although in the case of the latter, the statistical fog would have to 
be too dense to conceal a Japanese FDI significant enough to be taken as an explanation 
of the impressive gains in Chile’s participation in South American trade with Japan 
–already examined with the help of the first three tables.  
 
But the said underestimation does not hide other relevant facts. First, in Table 5 it can 
be observed the incentive that NAFTA represented for Japanese investments in Mexico 
during the nineties, as part of other factors that made the U.S. market more important 
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for the Japanese FDI [see, for example: SELA, 1991]. Second, the same table also shows 
that Brazil continues to be the main Latin American destination of “real” Japanese FDI, 
which has traditionally concentrated there in manufactures [Saavedra-Rivano, 1994] 
and has targeted primarily the Brazilian domestic market and then also the 
MERCOSUR sub-regional market. This targeting could explain in part the significant 
loss in the participation of Brazil in South American exports to Japan, but it does not 
explain the even greater loss in Brazil’s participation in South American imports from 
Japan –both losses shown in Table 1. And third, Table 5 shows blatantly the steep fall of 
Peru as a Latin American destination of Japanese FDI, from an enviable second place 
between 1965 and 1975 to a marginal position thereafter.  
 
Summing up, specifically in regards to among South American countries’ changes in 
their relative weights as trade partners of Japan, the statistics examined have made 
clear that these changes can be attributed to differences in sector structures of exports 
to Japan for the case of Colombia only, because the ones of Chile, MERCOSUR and Peru 
are all the three similar in their high and growing concentration in primary goods. As 
for the examined data on Japanese investments, its serious shortcomings 
notwithstanding, leaves the impression that the changes in question are hardly 
attributable to such investments in the cases of Brazil and Chile, whereas for the case of 
Peru it is found the expected correlation between its both decreasing shares in trade 
and investment.  
 
Thus, other explanatory factors are needed to duly explain the ranking changes within 
South America before Japan. Given this research paper’s focus, the analysis in its 
following section is limited to the most relevant factors behind Peru’s deteriorated 
position in investment and trade flows with Japan. However, some of the identified 
factors –such as the infrastructure and logistics of transport, for instance- also seem to 
form part of the explanation of MERCOSUR’s losses in trade shares and are important 
reasons of Chile’s much improved position as trade partner of Japan. 
 
II. Main explanatory factors of the deterioration in Peru’s investment 
and trade relations with Japan  
 
Having found in the previous section that the sector structure of exports does not 
explain the fall of Peru’s share in South American trade with Japan, and given that it is 
still pending the explanation of the strong fall in Peru’s share as a recipient of Japanese 
FDI in Latin America, it is now pertinent to analyze the main factors explaining the 
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significant deterioration happened –from the mid-seventies until the mid-2000s- in the 
Peru-Japan economic relations, especially in the investment aspects though also in 
their bilateral trade5.    
 
The main factors have been four:  
1) The high level of human insecurity and the threat to the Peruvian State that 
represented the terrorism of “Shining Path” (SL) and of the “Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement” (MRTA) –both acronyms in Spanish of course; 
2) The economic instability of the eighties –accentuated during the second half of that 
decade, which besides of contracting and impoverishing the Peruvian economy as a 
whole, significantly debilitated a number of activities with strategic roles in the 
agglomeration of economic gravity forces, thus providing the excuse for ulterior 
decisions (taken during the nineties) that ultimately precipitated the loss of national 
control over some of those crucial activities –such as maritime and air transport; 
3) The geopolitical insecurity that resulted from the strategic mistrust that tainted the 
relations of the U.S. with Peru during the three decades elapsed between the seventies 
and the nineties; and 
4) The low quality of Peru’s trade policies implemented since the mid-seventies until the 
year 2000.  
 
It is evident that the aforementioned factors had a generalized impact and negatively 
affected not only Peru’s investment and trade relations with Japan. However, this 
bilateral economic relation was the relatively most affected indeed, not only because 
several of the said factors refer to insecurity issues and it is well-known the proverbial 
Japanese obsession with security, but also –and more importantly so- because the 
Peru-Japan economic relations were directly and effectively torpedoed by actions 
derived from those factors and especially from the more linked to the insecurity 
equation. This justifies the order in which the factors have been listed above and will be 
discussed in the next paragraphs6. The analysis that follows also deals with the 
interrelations among the factors and mentions, when pertinent, the main corrective 
                                                  
5 This research paper does not cover the –economic and political- cooperation aspects. These have been excellent 
during almost all the time since Peru-Japan diplomatic relations were established in 1873, with the sole exceptions of 
two difficult periods: during the second world war, and during the government of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) 
[Aquino, 1994; Nakao, 2010].  
6 The entire analysis in this section puts the emphasis on “internal” factors and particularly on those where the main 
responsibility lies with Peru. But it is worth to clarify that in several of these factors –and their adverse consequences- 
there has been a great deal of interference by interests linked to the changes in relative weights among South 
American countries examined in Section I. Even though there are enough documentations and indications in this 
regard, it is preferable not to tackle them in a paper such as this one.    
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measures applied during the period examined –with various levels of success or 
consistency as it will be seen.  
 
Targeted terrorists attacks in the nineties 
 
For the reasons explained in the previous paragraph, the most important explanatory 
factor is the high levels of human insecurity and political risk that were generated by 
the rise of terrorist actions led by SL and the MRTA during the eighties until the 
beginning of the nineties. The key corrective measure in this regard was the successful 
capture of the leaders of both organizations as a result of the antiterrorist strategy 
implemented by the first government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-1995). Even though 
from that point onwards the Peruvian State was no longer under siege by SL and MRTA, 
these terrorist groups did succeed in their specific aim of halting the inflow of Japanese 
investment and the reactivation of trade with Japan to the levels that were to be 
expected with Fujimori as President. 
 
The two most harmful acts of sabotage were the pre-meditated murder of three 
Japanese experts from JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) in April of 1991, 
and the armed assault on the residence of Japanese Ambassador and its occupation 
with prominent hostages from December 1996 to April 1997. The dates of these attacks 
are very revealing of the specific motivations behind them, because the first one 
occurred when there were high expectations for Japanese investment and trade with 
Peru, due to the recently inaugurated Fujimori Administration which from its 
beginning implemented decisive measures to stabilize the economy and to fight 
terrorism. The second attack occurred when similar expectations revived from news 
that important agreements to launch Japan’s investment and trade with Peru were to 
be signed following a visit of the Japanese Prime Minister. No other Peruvian 
international trade and investment relation was so targeting and effectively boycotted 
by SL and MRTA terrorist acts. 
 
Also basically for political and security reasons, Peru-Japan trade and investment 
relations did not take off during the first half of the 2000s decade. Among such reasons, 
worth noting are: the pronounced cooling of the relations with Japan during the 
government of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), which resulted mostly from his unwise 
narrowing of this important bilateral relation to the tense particular issues related to 
Fujimori; and the preoccupying signals that were given by Toledo’s government and his 
predecessor’s – the transitional government of Valentin Paniagua (2000-2001), of 
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relaxation and eventual reversal of the fight against the terrorist groups that had 
brutally damaged Peru in general and its relations with Japan in particular, by hastily 
allowing for a massive release of convicted terrorists7.  
 
Peru’s economic debacle in the eighties and its sequels in key sectors 
 
The second explanatory factor deals with another basic aspect of security –the economic 
one- and has to do with the high levels of economic instability and risk that resulted 
from the disastrous handling of macroeconomic affairs as well as of the foreign debt 
problem during the first government of Alan García (1985-1990), which led to 
hyperinflation and total banning from international credit. This did not only adversely 
affect trade and scared away investment in general and from Japan in particular, but it 
also significantly debilitated public and private finances, thereby generating the 
conditions for the State to give up later on –during the nineties- some strategic 
economic sectors (especially those of international transport services and their related 
logistics and infrastructure activities, as will be discussed below) in the hands of 
interests linked to neighboring countries that compete with Peru in terms of 
agglomeration of economic gravity forces. This surrendering was promoted by some 
Peruvian private groups who, in order to reestablish their capitalization hardly hit by 
the crisis of the eighties, had associated with such interests to do businesses jointly in 
those strategic activities.  
 
The needed macroeconomic corrective measures were successfully applied by Fujimori’s 
first government, and since then there has been consistency on the matter. Sound 
macroeconomic management has indeed continued during all the administrations after 
Fujimori’s, including the second government of Alan García (2006-2011) who, in such 
respect, has redeemed himself before his country. Nevertheless, neither his second 
government nor the following of Toledo did enough or were inconsistent in terms of the 
actions required to correct Fujimori’s prejudicial measures regarding the strategic 
economic activities affected by the macroeconomic debacle of the eighties (as will be 
analyzed as part of the fourth factor). This is one of the reasons that explain why the 
benefits of macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth since the nineties 
were not fully capitalized by Peru in regards to its trade and investment relations with 
Japan. The other reasons deal with the first factor already discussed and with the two 
factors that will be presented next.  
                                                  
7 Between August 2001 and July 2006 a total of 2106 prisoners for terrorist acts were released, according to precise 
information made public only lately [Expreso newspaper, Lima, 24 July 2010]. 
15 
 
U.S.-Peru geopolitical mistrust between the seventies and nineties 
 
It is appropriate to discuss in third place a factor that also deals with security, but this 
time from a geopolitical point of view. The relations between the US and Peru became 
tainted of a strong strategic mistrust since the military government of Velasco 
(1968-1975) took the decision of buying important military equipment from the Soviet 
Union, after that Chile made similar purchases from the U.S. The following Peruvian 
governments over the next decades failed to balance such decision with changes in the 
sourcing of equivalent purchases or with other significant strategic rapprochement 
measures before the U.S. The ensuing unsolved mistrust likely contributed to reinforce 
the importance of Colombia, Ecuador, and especially Chile, as allies in the pursuit of 
U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific South American zone. This outcome was most 
probably taken into consideration by the Japanese when deciding the distribution of 
their trade and investment relations in that zone, given the well-known strategic 
relation between Japan and the U.S.  
 
During the period of Fujimori in power (1990-2000), such strategic mistrust may have 
weighted even more than democratic and human rights concerns in preventing the 
U.S.-Peru relations from being revalued as expected, given the impressive 
achievements in the fight against terrorism and successful macroeconomic policies 
implemented over that period. To this effect contributed all those interested in making 
sure that the said bilateral relationship was not revalued, who swiftly resorted to varied 
of tactics in order to fuel the strategic mistrust: from the more grotesque such as 
arguing that Peru, with Fujimori as President, would become a beachhead in South 
America for a Japanese economic “invasion”; to more elaborated speculations that Peru 
with Fujimori would become a laboratory for a trilateral (Japan-U.S.-Latin America) 
handling of the region’s affairs [Stallings and Szekely, 1993]. Most of these alarming 
tactics deliberately misjudged the nature of the Japan-U.S. relation and purposely 
exaggerated the demonstration effect over Latin America of Peru with Fujimori 
[Gonzalez-Vigil, 1994]. But they may have contributed to the absence of a strategic 
rapprochement between Peru and the U.S. during the nineties, a fact that likely 
refrained Japan from taken the bold investment and trade initiatives deserved by Peru 
in that decade, although the most dissuasive effect certainly came from the terrorist 
attacks already mentioned.  
 
It corresponds to Toledo’s government (2001-2006) the great credit for having taken the 
main corrective measure regarding the geopolitical insecurity factor, by strategically 
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approaching the U.S. and putting this super power at the center of a new Peruvian 
international strategy. This will be further discussed in the fourth section of this paper, 
and will be better understood with the help of the analysis that follows in this section.  
 
Peru’s wrong trade policies between the years 1975 and 2000 
 
The fourth explanatory factor is the poor quality of Peru’s trade policies –especially 
during the period elapsed between the 1975 and 2000 years. This is a period of time 
lengthy enough to include diverse governments with different ideological and policy 
orientations, thereby allowing for detecting their common flaw in terms of trade policy. 
This was the lack of solid trade strategies coherent with superior national security and 
foreign policy objectives, which made trade policy an easy prey of sudden swings in 
private sector interests and/or of superficial ideological preferences according to the 
government of the moment. This fundamental weakness distorted the handling of most 
of the basic issues in trade policy –in its broad sense covering both at-the-border and 
behind-the-border measures, particularly of those crucial to the agglomeration of 
economic gravity forces as well as to the facilitation and promotion of trade and 
investment in goods and services, besides of the traditional tariff issues. Much better 
was the quality of the policies on such issues that were implemented during that period 
by neighboring countries belonging to the same economic gravity zone –i.e. the Pacific 
South American zone- such as Chile and Colombia [see, for example: Kuwayama, 1999].   
 
Those Peruvian trade policies discouraged Japanese investment in a wide range of 
important sectors that included natural resource activities, manufacturing industries 
and key infrastructure and logistic services. On natural resource activities, the 
Japanese had to back away from their intention of investing a large amount of FDI in 
Peruvian mining by using the financing of big projects as a mechanism for obtaining 
ownership participation –the so-called debt-to-equity mechanism- in order to secure the 
supply of metals in the needed volumes. Such intention was initially curbed by the 
refusal of the military government of Morales Bermudez (1975-1980) to equate 
ownership control to the level of financing, and then it was entirely frustrated over the 
eighties, first because of delays during the second government of Fernando Belaunde 
(1980-1985) in payments owed for financing received, and finally due to Peru’s complete 
default during the first government of Alan Garcia (1985-1990). Similar problems 
experienced during those three Peruvian administrations were also responsible for the 
fact that the Japanese financing of the North Peruvian Oil Pipeline failed to drive 
Japanese FDI in Peru’s hydrocarbons sector [De la Flor, 1991].  
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With regards to the manufacturing sector, Japanese FDI in the automotive industry’s 
segments with key spillover effects –i.e. the assembly of vehicles though with increasing 
local manufacture of auto parts and accessories- had grown in Peru since the end of the 
sixties with the aim of turning the country in a hub for its projection to the Andean sub 
regional market. But later, during the nineties, such industrializing FDI was pushed to 
migrate to other CAN countries –Colombia and Venezuela- by the inept Peruvian trade 
policy of the Fujimori administrations. This policy, as has been documented 
[Gonzalez-Vigil, 2001], not only resulted in Peru’s auto exclusion from the CAN free 
trade area and customs union but also from the automotive CAN agreement, thus 
giving clear signals that it was not attaching priority to the Andean sub regional market 
in spite of the high manufacturing content of the intra-CAN trade. To make things even 
worse, that policy also kept a national tariff structure that increased Peru’s industrial 
production costs in comparison to similar costs in neighboring countries of the Pacific 
South American zone. All of which became an incentive for FDI in manufacturing to 
relocate to another country in the zone, consequently weakening Peru’s economic 
gravity power.  
 
Even greater negative effects, in terms of diverting economic forces away from Peru and 
towards its neighboring countries, had the bad Peruvian policy measures in maritime 
and air transport matters implemented during the eighties and even more so in the 
nineties. In these matters, the contrast with Chile’s well-known strategy aimed at 
positioning itself as the maritime and air traffic hub in the Pacific side of South America, 
is very useful to better understand the reasons behind the trade ranking changes 
revealed by the statistics already examined in Section I. It was so that, while Peru’s 
flawed policies allowed the destruction of Peruvian merchant marine and airlines, the 
Chilean government intensified its systematic support to a national airline –LAN- and 
two shipping lines –CSAV and CCNI- facilitating their quality improvements and 
growing international presence. Moreover, while Chile was getting ahead of its South 
American neighbors in terms of modernization of ports and airports, it was not until the 
2000s decade that Peru began to take similar measures for its mains port and airport 
–both in Callao. This happened around 20 years after Japan’s interest in the port of 
Callao had been frustrated, when the plan to modernize it with Japan’s financing was 
filed away in the early eighties and then progressively replaced by a cost-augmenting 
transfer of basic logistic operations from the port to private firms located outside the 
port, the larger of them controlled by Chilean capital and linked to the Chilean shipping 
lines aforementioned –thus aligned to Chile’s hub strategy.  
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It is therefore not surprising at all that such Peruvian policy gaffes –so much 
facilitators of the Chilean strategy- had negative effects in terms of the competitiveness 
of the port of Callao and of the design of the maritime routes for its export cargo. In fact, 
with regards to container cargo, during the first half of the 2000s decade, the port of 
Callao had two key disadvantages compared with the port of San Antonio (Chile), 
namely higher costs and less connectivity [Belaunde and Bryce, 2006]. This occurred in 
a context where rates charged by the private operators located outside the port of Callao 
represented as much as 71% of the total port costs faced by exporters and importers 
[Sgut, 2005], and at least 22 % of Callao’s cargo routed through the Pacific was already 
directly controlled by the two Chilean shipping companies aforementioned (not 
including their participation in cargo transported by shipping alliances).  
 
These shipping companies significantly contributed to neutralize Chile’s greater 
physical distance with a lower economic distance resulting from the agglomeration of 
container cargo in the main ports of that country. With this in mind, they designed their 
maritime routes in a way that pulled-down, in a southbound direction towards the main 
Chilean container ports of San Antonio or Valparaiso, not only to 62% of Callao’s export 
container cargo intended for northern trans-Pacific routes but also to 54% of the similar 
cargo intended for other routes via the Panama Canal –both export cargos thus forced to 
go south first in spite of ultimately destined to ports and markets up in northern 
locations. All this in sharp contrast with the handling of cargo by global shipping 
companies (such as Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping Co., Evergreen, and the like) that 
directly gave a northbound direction to 62% of Callao’s container cargo aiming at routes 
via the Panama Canal [NATHAN, 2005], which really makes sense given the location 
–to the north of Callao- of the main trans-oceanic (East-West) maritime routes as well 
as of the largest destination markets for Peruvian exports.  
  
The Peruvian situation in terms of air transport and connectivity is even worse8. 
However, given that the bulk of Peru’s trade with Asia-Pacific and other major regions 
are transported by sea – as is that of South America as a whole, the facts analyzed 
above are very revealing of one of the main explanatory factors of the ranking changes 
among South American countries in their trade with Japan -as described in Section I. 
With further reason, if due account is taken of the possible impact on the maritime 
routes used for MERCOSUR trade with Japan of the existence of CONOSUR, the so 
                                                  
8 According to data until 2008 analyzed by a relevant study [Kuoman and Yong, 2009], there were very few world 
class airlines that arrived to Peru and none from East Asia or Oceania, in a context where LAN not only controlled 
around 36% of international passenger flights serviced by the Lima Airport but also held practically a monopolistic 
control (90%) of passenger flights within the Peruvian domestic market. 
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named alliance between CSAV and the Argentinian shipping company MARUBA for 
transporting cargo between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South America. Thus, it 
seems clear that Chile’s progress in terms of maritime transportation and port 
infrastructure, so coherent with its strategy to become a hub, contributed a great deal 
–along with the flaws and delays of its neighbors in these matters- to the strong gains in 
Chile’s shares –and to the simultaneous strong falls in MERCOSUR and Peru shares- in 
trade flows with Japan, particularly from a South American export perspective. These 
new evidences reinforce earlier findings on trade diversion in detriment of Peru and 
other CAN member countries [Gonzalez-Vigil and Kuriyama, 2000]. 
 
Starting in the decade of the 2000s, Peru began to apply some important corrective 
measures regarding its problems of port and airport infrastructure and logistics, 
although there is still a great deal to be done on transport matters in order to reverse its 
serious connectivity problems –especially by air. At the same time, there has been 
significant progress since that last decade in the correction of other severe trade policy 
flaws. It is better to mention these corrective measures in the next section, because they 
are part of a new strategy that is producing many important results, one of them being 
precisely the negotiation of the FTA with Japan. 
 
III.  Growing role of FTAs in trade and foreign policies 9 
 
The widespread proliferation of FTAs, witnessed since the onset of the 21st Century, 
signals their increased role as strategic tools for advancing national and regional 
interests in a context of globalization. Countries all over the world are given to FTAs an 
enhanced role in their recent growth and trade strategies, as well as in the related 
adjustments to their respective foreign policies. Japan and Peru have both followed this 
path –though each one in its own way of course, thus paving the road towards their 
bilateral FTA. 
 
Changes in Peru’s international strategy 
  
With the government of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) began a process of redefinition of 
Peru’s strategy to address its permanent national security and foreign policy objectives. 
Of outmost importance in the new Peru’s international strategy is the recognition of the 
                                                  
9 Due to the contents of this section and the need to be concise in order to do not extend this paper excessively, the 
reader could get the erroneous impression that the Section III conveys official positions about the issues that are 
addressed in it, which is why it is now necessary to make explicit the disclaimer of rigor, consisting in that the 
opinions put forward in this paper are solely of its authors’ responsibility. 
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central role that the relation with the U.S. plays as a top priority strategic partner. This 
has involved a process of strategic rapprochement between the two countries –which 
initial stages were marked by the visit to Peru of President Bush early in 2002- aimed 
at building a new Peru-U.S. bilateral agenda, a more balanced and modern agenda 
emphasizing constructive socio-economic issues from a capacity for development 
perspective –though without neglecting common interests in matters of security and the 
South American context, rather than the stressful issues that had polluted the bilateral 
agenda during the strategic mistrust times. With such purpose, a Peru-U.S. FTA was 
planned as a key tool for signaling the strategic rapprochement as well as for starting 
the process for the new bilateral agenda building-up. Such FTA was also conceived as 
the catalytic element for propelling another important ingredient of the new Peru’s 
international strategy.   
 
That other ingredient is a new trade strategy, coherent with superior national interests 
as opposed to that of the nineties, but at the same time without taking any steps back in 
terms of economic openness and trade liberalization as had been done by the trade 
policies of the seventies and eighties. The new trade strategy translated into the 
adoption of a tiered national tariffs structure which, at its lowest levels, reduced the 
cost of importing capital goods and inputs of better quality with the aim of promoting 
local production in general and particularly of competitive value-added products. It also 
translated into an important change of emphasis in liberalization modality, from the 
unilateral modality emphasized during the nineties that had resulted in the handing 
over of some strategic economic activities in exchange for nothing (such as were the 
cases of air and maritime transport, to mention only two examples related to issues 
already discussed in Section II), to a new emphasis in a liberalization based on the 
reciprocity achieved through the negotiation of trade agreements. 
 
The latter has given a renewed importance to the potential benefits of obtaining 
advantageous access to expanded markets –provided by free trade zones (FTZs) formed 
through preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in terms of trade and investment 
diversification and the underlying productive transformation and modernization. The 
great novelty in the recent rediscovering of such significant potential contributions of 
PTAs –that had been acknowledged by the Peruvian trade policies since the sixties but 
then were foolishly minimized in the nineties, consists in that now the establishing of  
FTZs through PTAs is no longer done with other Latin American countries only but also 
with developed countries as well as with developing countries in other regions of the 
world. In fact, during the first decade of this century, Peru not only completed its 
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participation in the Andean FTZ and agreed to establish a FTZ with MERCOSUR, but 
also launched an intense process of negotiations of last-generation comprehensive PTAs 
(the so-called FTAs) with countries outside the region. These FTAs are powerful tools for 
investment and trade diversification as well as for improving the economy’s 
competitiveness, because they involve not only advanced commitments of reciprocal 
liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment in goods and services, but also 
the concerted adoption of best practices in public policy and business affairs. 
 
A wise first step in the new Peruvian trade strategy regarding trade agreements is to 
have begun with the U.S. the process of FTA negotiations with industrialized countries. 
The negotiation of the Peru-U.S. FTA –started in May of 2004 after initial consultations 
with the occasion of President Bush’s visit mentioned earlier and formal preparations 
since the second quarter of 2003, provided the right signals of a firm political decision in 
favor of a strategic rapprochement between the countries and of the top priority 
accorded to the U.S. in Peru’s brand new international strategy. This in turn facilitated 
the establishing of similar FTA negotiations with other economic powers, particularly 
with those in Asia, without becoming exposed –or at least becoming less exposed- to 
maneuvers for instigating strategic suspicions as the experienced in the nineties (which 
were mentioned in Section II). 
 
The same was also facilitated through the strong signals of commitment to Trans- 
Pacific economic integration given by Peru when it initiated –in early 2003- the process 
that led to APEC Peru 2008, as well as when it joined the group of APEC economies 
supporting the initiative to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), 
which was welcomed as a good long- term prospect by APEC Leaders in November 2006. 
The next steps in the process of FTA negotiations were taken in the framework of an 
accurately formulated technical agenda [MINCETUR, 2005], which the second 
government of Alan Garcia (2006-2011) rightly endorsed and gave continuity to its 
implementation10. 
                                                  
10 It is however worth mentioning that the said Garcia’s Administration was not as coherent as had been the one of 
Toledo in terms of giving to FTAs the first priority as trade liberalization modality. In fact, while on the one hand it 
promoted FTA negotiations, on the other it enacted nineties-like unilateral measures on tariffs and non-tariff issues 
fostered by particular groups linked to interests from countries afraid of losing market shares and/or policy influence 
vis-à-vis the economic powers in Peru’s agenda for FTA negotiations. Those unilateral gifts put at risk some FTA 
negotiations –and/or circumvented their results based on reciprocity, by granting similar treatment to other countries 
without extracting equivalent concessions from them. An example was the unilateral reduction of tariffs implemented 
at the end of 2007, which included products of Mexico’s priority export interest at the very moment that this country 
and Peru were negotiating the conversion into a modern FTA of their old trade agreement of partial scope. Such gift 
made Mexico less urged to accept Peru’s priority export requests and therefore paralyzed for several years that 
bilateral negotiation. Another example was the unilateral extension to all trade partners of the national treatment in 
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As a result, to date Peru has in force bilateral FTAs of last generation with many of the 
larger APEC economies such as –in chronological order- the U.S., Canada, Singapore, 
China, Korea (South) and Japan, and has committed with Thailand the conversion of an 
existing trade agreement into an FTA11 (Table 6). In addition, Peru is now negotiating a 
high-standard plurilateral FTA –the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), 
together with eight APEC economies (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, the U.S. and Vietnam). This provisional number of nine negotiating parties 
will likely increase in the near future, because other APEC members have already 
stated formally their interest in joining the TPP negotiations –Japan, among them. 
 
Table 6 Peru’s FTAs 
Status Partner Signed In effect
In effect United States Apr 2006 Feb 2009
Chile Aug 2006 Mar 2009
Singapore May 2008 Aug 2009
Canada May 2008 Aug 2009
China Apr 2009 Mar 2010
EFTA Jul 2010 Jul 2011
Swissland Jul 2010 Jul 2011
Korea Mar 2011 Aug 2011
Thailand 2003 - 2010 Dec 2011
Mexico Apr 2011 Feb 2012
Japan May 2011 Mar 2012
Signed Norway Jul 2010
Ireland Jul 2010
Panama May 2011
Costa Rica May 2011
Guatemala Dec 2011
Finished negotiation European Union Feb 2010
In negotiation El Salvador
Honduras
TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)
Source: Ministerio de Ceomercio Exterior y Turismo (Peru) web page
(http://www.acuerdoscomerciales.gob.pe/).
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
government procurement agreed with the US –on reciprocal terms- in the respective bilateral FTA. Ironically, such 
in-exchange-for-nothing extension was leaked as part of an avalanche of legal decrees enacted in early 2008 with the 
pretext of implementing the US-Peru FTA.  
11 To the list of Peru’s FTAs with developed economies and/or non-Latin American developing economies, it must 
be added, regarding Europe, that to date Peru has already signed a FTA with EFTA countries and has also completed 
successfully the negotiation of a FTA with the EU. 
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Japan's FTA strategy and Latin America 
 
Japan had a slow start in bilateral FTA negotiations. The multilateral trade negotiation 
through GATT and WTO was the main focus of Japanese government for over decades. 
However, by the end of the 1990s, it became clear that WTO negotiations were not 
making much progress. At that moment, Japan received FTA proposals from Mexico and 
Korea in 1998 and from Singapore in 1999. Since then, Japan is trying to catch up with 
other countries in its region (Table 7). 
 
Table 7 Japan’s FTAs 
Status Partner Signed In effect
In effect Singapore Jan 2002 Nov 2002
Mexico Sep 2004 Apr 2005
Malaysia Dec 2005 Jul 2006
Chile Mar 2007 Sep 2007
Thailand Apr 2007 Nov 2007
Indonesia Aug 2007 Jul 2008
Brunei Jun 2007 Jul 2008
ASEAN Apr 2008 Dec 2008
Philippines Sep 2006 Dec 2008
Swissland Feb 2009 Sep 2009
Vietnam Dec 2008 Oct 2009
India Feb 2011 Aug 2011
Peru May 2011 Mar 2012
In negociation Korea
Gulf Cooperation Council
Australia
Source: Ministry of Economy and Industry (Japan) web page
(http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/index.html).
 
Once Japan started to actively pursue FTA negotiations, it placed priority on East Asia 
(MFA 2004). East Asia here conceptualized as including (besides of Japan, of course) 
China and South Korea as well as ASEAN countries. There are a few reasons for this 
basic priority. First, FTAs with East Asian countries could bring relatively large 
marginal benefits to Japan. Among Japan’s major trading partners, namely East Asia, 
United States and Europe, East Asian countries are developing economies having 
relatively high tariff rates at that time. Japanese government expected that FTAs with 
these countries could result into significant tariff reduction favoring their exports. 
 
Second, FTAs with individual East Asian economies could lead to a regional FTA that 
would bring political and economic stability to that region. North America and Europe 
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already have regional free-trade areas such as NAFTA and EU. Similar regional 
economic institutions would be beneficial for Japan because East Asia is not only one of 
its major trading partners, but also many Japanese companies have their 
manufacturing bases in the region. In addition, if Japan succeeded to take an initiative 
in creating a regional FTA, it could maintain its political leverage. 
 
Third, East Asia has been the center of economic growth for the last half century. The 
high growth and export performance of Japan in the 1960s and 1970s was followed by 
the so-called four tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and then by 
some original ASEAN member countries other than Singapore. Later, China became the 
second largest economy in the world, and some countries that recently joined ASEAN 
are also taking off. Japan can benefit from this continued growth in the region through 
FTAs with East Asian countries. 
 
Due to these reasons, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs targeted to South Korea and 
ASEAN as the partners with whom its FTA negotiations process should begin (MFA 
2004), by dealing with each of them separately in a first stage yet with the view of  
expanding the process towards an East Asian regional FTA. However, these 
negotiations did not progress as Japan desired (Urata 2006). 
 
Singapore was the first country to sign an FTA with Japan in 2002. Because it is a small 
economy with practically no agricultural sector, there was little conflict of interest over 
an FTA between the two countries. 
 
Regarding the negotiation with South Korea, which started in December 2003, it soon 
came to a deadlock in 2004. From Korean viewpoints, Japan was very unwilling to 
liberalize its agricultural market. Additionally, the Korean manufacturing sector feared 
an increase of imports from Japan (Okuda 200). Later on, the relationship between the 
two countries deteriorated because of boarder disputes, and the negotiation has not 
been restored yet. 
 
As for the negotiation with ASEAN as a group, Japan failed to take the initiative. In 
fact, both China and South Korea went ahead of Japan on the matter. China signed its 
FTA with ASEAN in 2004 while South Korea did so in 2005. Japan first signed bilateral 
FTAs with each of the original ASEAN-6 countries, and it was not until 2008 that 
finally signed an FTA with ASEAN as a group. 
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In contrast to the comparatively slow path of FTA negotiations in East Asia, Japan was 
successful in terms of reaching bilateral agreements with two Latin American 
countries: Mexico in 2004 and Chile in 2007. The motivation for these FTAs is different 
from that concerning East Asian countries.  
 
Both Mexico and Chile had been very aggressive in FTA negotiations. In their respective 
markets, Japanese products had price disadvantage over the products from other 
countries with which Mexico and Chile had signed FTA agreements. Especially, 
automobile and electronics manufacturers were facing strong competition with their 
rivals from the United States, Europe and South Korea. These manufacturers pushed 
the Japanese government to start FTA negotiations with Mexico and Chile so that they 
could compete in fair ground with their rivals. A similar motivation also pushed the 
Japanese government to negotiate the FTA with Peru. 
 
IV.  Japan-Peru FTA negotiations: the process and main results 
 
The conduct of the negotiation of a comprehensive Japan-Peru FTA was made possible 
by the effective effort displayed, since the beginning of the second government of Alan 
Garcia, in order to rescue this bilateral relation from its lethargy during Toledo’s 
government and –even more so- to propel it to higher levels than in the past. With this 
purpose, an advanced bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was successfully negotiated and 
it was signed during the official visit of the then Prime Minister Taro Aso scheduled 
back-to-back with the XVI APEC Leaders Summit (Lima, November 2008). This 
bilateral visit also allowed for the leaders of the two countries to give a green light to a 
formal joint process of consultations and preparation of preliminary studies on the 
possible negotiation of a bilateral FTA. This process took place with an active 
participation of the business sector and arrived at favorable conclusions in a relatively 
short time, so by April 2009 the leaders of both countries launched the agreed FTA 
negotiations.  
 
The first phase of the negotiations had a fast pace and was very fruitful. The first four 
negotiating rounds happened between May and October 2009 and produced significant 
progress in the majority of the numerous issues under negotiation12. A relatively slow 
                                                  
12 These comprehensive FTA negotiations included the following 17 trade matters: market access to trade, in goods 
and related trade remedies; rules of origin; customs procedures and trade facilitation; sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures; technical standards and conformity procedures; cross-border trade in services; telecommunications; 
temporary mobility of people for business purposes; public procurement; intellectual property rights; competition 
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paced phase followed because the negotiations became concentrated on sensitive issues, 
which in this case were basically related to market access in terms of tariffs elimination 
or reduction, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPM), and technical barriers to 
trade (TBT). Regarding the last two, it is well known that Japan’s SPM and TBT are 
quite strict and on these matters it is reluctant to accept commitments going beyond 
those in force at the WTO level. Regarding the former, for Peru it was of great 
importance to obtain that its exports of food products –from agricultural and/or fishing 
origin- enter into the Japanese market with a tariff treatment either advantageous or at 
least equivalent vis-à-vis competitors, while Japan used to exclude most of this type of 
products from the FTAs that it negotiates. All of which shows clearly how difficult were 
the negotiations on such issues. 
 
However, there was room for exchanging mutually beneficial concessions. This 
possibility emerged from the top priority accorded by Japan to obtain that its exports of 
automotive products have access to the Peruvian market in advantageous –or at least 
equivalent- conditions to those that Peru had already granted to similar products from 
the US (through the respective bilateral FTA in force since February 1st, 2009), and/or to 
those that Peru would likely grant to similar products from the EU (through the 
respective FTA, which negotiation was completed in March 1st, 2010) and from (South) 
Korea as a result of the respective bilateral FTA that was being negotiated in parallel 
(which is already in force since August 1, 2011).  
 
But the possibility of constructively exchanging Peru’s foods export priorities for Japan’s 
automotive export priorities was about to disappear when, during the last months of 
2009, certain interest groups in Peru fostered the enacting of another unilateral 
elimination or reduction of tariffs including automotive products. Had this attempt 
succeeded, it would have been even more prejudicial than the unilateral reduction of 
tariffs implemented at the end of 2007 (see footnote 10 above), since it would have 
sabotaged Peru’s bilateral FTA negotiations by then ongoing not only with Japan but 
also with other important partners –such as the EU and South Korea, similarly 
interested in obtaining favorable access to the Peru’s market for their automotive 
products and similarly reluctant to give favorable access into their markets to Peruvian 
food products.  
 
Fortunately, such a destructive attempt did not prosper this time, which allowed for the 
                                                                                                                                                  
policy; business climate improvement; cooperation (and trade capacity-building); disputes settlement; institutional 
and horizontal matters. 
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conduct of the fifth round of Japan-Peru FTA negotiations (February 2010), where most 
issues were successfully completed and, with regards to the most sensitive ones related 
to market access, it was agreed to carry out successive exchanges of improved offers 
during the months ahead until arriving to mutually beneficial concessions. 
 
After seven rounds, both countries finally concluded their negotiations in November 
2010 and signed the resulting bilateral FTA in May 2011.  
 
This agreement will eliminate import tariffs for 99% of products bilaterally traded 
within ten years. Among the products of Peru’s interest, almost all of the mining sector 
will achieve immediate free access to the Japanese market. In the agricultural sector, 
Japan’s import tariffs will be eliminated immediately for fresh asparagus, wood and 
articles of wood. Tariff rates for other products -such as purple corn, giant corn and 
jumbo flying squid, will be lowered as well. It is worth mentioning that Japan excluded 
749 tariff items of sensitive products from the tariffs negotiation. This number of 
excluded items is much smaller compared with those in Japan’s FTA agreements with 
Mexico (1,300 items) and Chile (1,200 times) [COMEXPERU 2011]. 
 
Among the products of Japan’s interest, Peru’s tariff rate for automobile will be 
eliminated within four to nine years. The tariffs for auto-parts will be eliminated in 
maximum of ten years. With regards to electronics, tariffs for television sets and 
blue-ray disc recorder will be eliminated immediately, while those for lithium-ion and 
lead-acid batteries will be eliminated in nine years. In addition, some Japanese 
agricultural products obtained better access to the Peruvian market. The tariff for sake 
will be eliminated immediately while those for persimmon, pears and apples will be 
eliminated in five, seven and fifteen years respectively. 
 
After the FTA was signed in May 2011, it was expected to go into effect before the end of 
2011. However, because of the Tohoku earthquake and disasters caused by the 
subsequent tsunami and nuclear plant accidents, the ratification process in Japan’s 
Diet was finally concluded in December 2011. This paved the way for its entering into 
effect since March 1, 2012. 
 
Final Remarks 
 
The title of this paper could have included the phrase “So that history does not repeat 
itself.” Today, Peru is in a much better position than twenty years ago in order to take 
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due advantage of its FTA with Japan as well as of the FTAs it has already signed with 
several other economic powers. Nevertheless, Peruvians should not take this for 
granted because, even though it is true that Peru has corrected and overcome some of 
the main negative factors of the past, it is also true that in some cases there have been 
inconsistencies and in others the most important corrections are still to come. 
 
Therefore, there is a need for Peru to persevere and not to let the guard down, for there 
were interests in play that frustrated earlier opportunities for trade and investment 
with Japan that now could also try, in the face of even more promising opportunities for 
Peru not only with Japan but also with the U.S., China, South Korea, Canada, the E.U 
and EFTA –to mention only some of the better opportunities at hand, to frustrate them 
or, if this is no longer possible, at least to minimize their beneficial effects for Peru and 
its position in the Pacific South American. 
 
From a Japanese perspective, the FTA with Peru comes on top of Japan’s previously 
established FTAs with Mexico and with Chile in the effort for becoming less 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis its main competitors in terms of preferential market access as 
well as of investment and business facilitation measures granted by Latin American 
countries. It was very important for Japanese automobile and electronics industry to 
secure fair market access against their competitors in the U.S., EU and South Korea. 
 
It is likely that the leveling of the competition field motivation may push Japan to seek 
similar negotiations with Colombia and Costa Rica in a non distant future, taking into 
consideration the former’s FTAs with the U.S. and with South Korea as well as the 
latter’s with the U.S. and with China. By the same token, it seems likely that the said 
motivation would not be an equally pressing factor in Japan’s economic relationships 
with other important South American partners such as Brazil and Argentina, insofar as 
they keep themselves out of FTAs with Japan’s main competitors. 
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